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The Ins and “Outs” of Domestic Forum Selection
Clauses in ICSID Arbitral Disputes
Carleigh E. Zeman †
Abstract: Bilateral investment treaties, known as BITs, are treaties
between two nations that include a set of protections to encourage
investment between the two signatories.
Among these
protections, BITs often include an arbitration provision to allow
states to seek a remedy in front of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID] or another
international arbitral tribunal. However, parties may waive the
right to arbitrate certain claims, effectively superseding the
international treaty, if a State and foreign investor sign a private
contract containing a forum selection clause. Often, these clauses
call for initial or exclusive resolution of claims in the State’s
domestic courts. ICSID tribunals have held that such clauses may
eliminate the tribunal’s ability to hear part or all of an
international investment dispute, undermining the purpose and
effectiveness of BITs. Further, because foreign investors often
face prejudice and other disadvantages in State domestic courts,
these investors may effectively be denied any legal remedy. This
article seeks to explore the inherent contradiction in allowing
parties to supersede an international treaty via private contract,
the strategies an investor may use to evade an unfavorable forum
selection clause once signed, as well as the ways in which
arbitrators can respond to this contradiction to ensure a legal
remedy for foreign investors.
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I. Introduction
Bilateral investment treaties are agreements between two
nations, usually a developed nation and a developing nation, which
include a set of rules and protections designed to encourage
investors in the developed nation to invest in the economy and
infrastructure of the developing nation. 1 One such protection
typically included in these treaties is an arbitration provision that
allows the investor to seek a remedy in front of an international
arbitral tribunal. 2 A remedy from an international arbitral institution
is preferable to ordinary domestic adjudication because generally,
an arbitral hearing will take place in a disinterested, third-party State
in front of an international panel of impartial arbitrators. 3 The
1 See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on
Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 105,
105–06 (1986).
2 Id. at 109–10; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], INV. DIV,
DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTERPRISE AFF’S, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A LARGE SAMPLE SURVEY 9 (2012),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291678.pdf
[https://perma.cc/32V2-2PT8] [hereinafter OECD SURVEY] (“Over time, [Investor-State
Dispute Settlement] through international arbitration has become a common feature of
investment treaties – only 108 treaties, or 6.5% of the sample, do not provide for
international arbitration.”).
3 See Number of Arbitrators and Method of Their Appointment – ICSID Convention
Arbitration, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS. (“ICSID”),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Number-of-Arbitrators-and-Method-ofAppointment-Convention-Arbitration.aspx [https://perma.cc/P6BF-P2DN] (last visited
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arbitral rules in such proceedings are accessible, often in different
languages, 4 and the final award is enforceable and binding against
states that have joined the New York Convention. 5
The right to seek arbitration, however, may be signed away by
parties in a private contract. This occurs when the private contract
between the State or State entity and the foreign investor contains a
forum selection clause, usually for the domestic courts of the
developing nation. 6 This is problematic for the investor, who may
find itself seriously disadvantaged in those foreign courts because
of a language barrier, lack of local counsel, simple prejudice, or any
combination of those factors.
All three factors seem to be present in the case of Dirk Herzig
as Insolvency Administrator over the Assets of Unionmatex
Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Turkmenistan, 7 an ongoing dispute
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (“ICSID”). In 2008, Unionmatex won a public tender for
contracts for construction of grain mills and bakeries in
Turkmenistan totaling € 144 million. 8 However, after a series of
alleged breaches on the part of the Turkmen government,
negotiations broke down and construction stopped. 9
Nov. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Number of Arbitrators].
4 See,
e.g.,
ICSID
Convention
in
Other
Languages,
ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID-Convention-in-otherLanguages.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q2K3-ZY55] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (providing
copies of the ICSID Convention in twenty different languages).
5 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
opened for signature June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force June 7, 1959)
[hereinafter New York Convention]; see also Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan,
Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand
Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 88 (2005).
6 See, e.g., Dirk Herzig as Insolvency Administrator over the Assets of Unionmatex
Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/18/35 [hereinafter
Unionmatex] (showing how a German company may have signed away its right to bring
certain claims under the arbitration and umbrella clauses of the Germany-Turkmenistan
BIT by signing a private contract containing a forum selection clause for the domestic
courts of Turkmenistan).
7 Id.
8 Jack Ballantyne, Turkmenistan Faces Two New ICSID Claims, GLOB. ARB. REV.
(Oct. 17, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1175731/turkmenistan-facestwo-new-icsid-claims [https://perma.cc/9KSS-FJFN].
9 See id. (alleging that Turkmenistan’s breaches included failure to provide visa and
customs clearances, make agreed advance payments, provide access to gas, water, and
electricity at worksites, and provide acceptable groundwater levels at the work sites).
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In accordance with the forum selection clause contained in the
construction contracts, Unionmatex sought a remedy in the
Turkmen domestic courts, but received only “farcical court
proceedings” 10 rank with alleged due process violations that, not
surprisingly, resulted in a decision in favor of the Turkmen
government. 11 Unionmatex filed a request for ICSID arbitration
hearings in late 2018, but Turkmenistan has objected to the arbitral
tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute. 12 To add insult to injury,
Unionmatex, a German company with a successful history of 96
years in business, 13 filed for bankruptcy in 2014 as a result of its
dealings with Turkmenistan. 14
If the tribunal finds that it cannot hear Unionmatex’s case
because of a forum selection clause that grants exclusive
jurisdiction to the Turkmen courts, then the German company will
have no remedy. Even more concerning, should ICSID find no
jurisdiction, is the reality that parties may supersede an international
treaty via a private contract, eliminating both parties’ right to seek
a remedy for certain causes of action from an international arbitral
tribunal. This paper seeks to explore this contradiction, enumerate
the issues inherent in hearing cases in the domestic courts of
developing nations, and consider the options that investors 15 and
10 Alison Ross, ICSID Claim in the Oven Against Turkmenistan, GLOB. ARB. REV.
(Dec. 20, 2016), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1079152/icsid-claim-in-theoven-against-turkmenistan [https://perma.cc/DHB4-PPT7].
11 See Ballantyne, supra note 8 (stating that the foreign investor was prevented from
bringing a translator, that its local representative resigned from the case facing extreme
pressure from the Turkmen government, and that its further filings either failed or were
ignored).
12 Case Details, Dirk Herzig as Insolvency Administrator over the Assets of
Unionmatex Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Turkmenistan (ICSID Case No. ARB/18/35),
ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/18/35
(click “Procedural Details” tab) [https://perma.cc/M7YT-SZ83] (last visited Nov. 24,
2020) (reporting that the Respondent filed a request to address the objections to jurisdiction
as a preliminary question on Sept. 13, 2019 and again on Sept. 28, 2020).
13 Ross, supra note 10.
14 See Luke Eric Peterson & Zoe Williams, Turkmenistan Update: Award Rendered
in Garanti Koza’s BIT Arbitration; German Investor Files a Notice of Dispute, INV. ARB.
REP. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/turkmenistan-update-awardrendered-in-garanti-kozas-bit-arbitration-german-investor-files-a-notice-of-dispute/
[https://perma.cc/LY7D-CZ87].
15 Note that the term “investor” as it applies to investment disputes does not
exclusively refer to a single individual investor, nor does “investment” exclusively refer
to cash contributions. More commonly, “investor” refers to a corporation or group of

2021

FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN ICSID DISPUTES

477

arbitrators can pursue to prevent foreign parties from becoming
trapped by problematic forum selection clauses.
The most obvious solution is, of course, to not sign a contract
that contains an unfavorable forum selection clause. However, for
parties that do not appreciate the significance of such clauses, feel
they lack bargaining power to negotiate the contract, or
overestimate the reliability of the courts in the foreign jurisdiction
they submit themselves to, there may still be ways to get a dispute
in front of an arbitral tribunal.
Depending on the specific language of the clause, a tribunal may
interpret a weakly-worded forum selection clause as being limited
in either scope or jurisdiction, thus exempting some or all causes of
action from the agreement. 16 The doctrine forum non conveniens
may be used to argue that a case should move to a more convenient
forum than the one identified by the forum selection clause. 17
Finally, arbitrators can address the problem by treating the right to
seek dispute resolution in front of an arbitral tribunal as nonwaivable, or by introducing a standard by which to measure the
equitability of a forum selection clause. Each of these solutions
comes with its respective strengths and weaknesses, as explored
below.
Part II provides background information on bilateral investment
treaties, their history, and purposes. Part III describes international
arbitration as a legal mechanism and provides more specific
information on ICSID and the requirements for ICSID jurisdiction.
Part IV examines the disadvantages that a foreign investor might
encounter if forced to adjudicate an investment claim in the
domestic courts of a foreign State. Part V explores the various
solutions that both lawyers defending investors and arbitrators faced

shareholders. In the case of Unionmatex, the “investor” was a construction company and
the “investment” was building mills and grain factories in Turkmenistan for the benefit of
the Turkmen population. See Melissa María Valdez García, The Path Towards Defining
“Investment” in ICSID Investor-State Arbitrations: The Open-Ended Approach, 18 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 27, 30 (2018) (noting that many BITs and trade agreements with
investment chapters have broad, nonexclusive definitions for investment terms).
16 See generally John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 1791 (2019) (elaborating on how U.S. courts interpret specific terms and phrases
contained in choice-of-forum clauses in determining the scope and exclusivity of such
clauses).
17 See Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549
U.S. 422, 428 (2007).
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with an investment claim can use to prevent the miscarriage of
justice in ICSID cases. Finally, Part VI concludes this piece.
II. Bilateral Investment Treaties
A bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) is a treaty involving two
States, often a capital-exporting (developed) and capital-importing
(developing) state. 18 BITs tend to be reciprocal, meaning that the
rights and responsibilities of the treaty apply equally to investors of
both States. 19 These treaties deal almost exclusively with
investment-related issues, extending a common core of substantive
promises to investors, with the term “investment” typically defined
broadly. 20 Since the creation of the first BIT in 1959, 21 the
instrument has grown in popularity with over 2,500 broadly similar
agreements currently in existence. 22 The United States is no
exception; since the 1980s, the country has signed over 40 BITs,
primarily with developing nations. 23 Until recently, the North
American Free Trade Agreement, better known as NAFTA, 24 also
18 Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct
Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 402 (2011).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See id. at 401 (citing the 1959 treaty between Germany and Pakistan as the first
BIT). But see John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the
Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 302, 327 (explaining that BITs were preceded
by Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties, which worked similarly to protect the
interests of U.S. nationals doing business overseas).
22 Yackee, supra note 18, at 401.
23 The United States has signed BITs with Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (Zaire), Croatia, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia,
Georgia, Grenada, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, the
Republic of the Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Trinidad
& Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Uzbekistan. United States Bilateral
Investment Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.state.gov/investmentaffairs/bilateral-investment-treaties-and-related-agreements/united-states-bilateralinvestment-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/AKC5-2SHU].
24 The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), also known as the “New
NAFTA,” entered into force on July 1, 2020. Under the USMCA’s Investment Chapter,
investors from Canada or the United States will no longer have access to investor State
dispute settlement mechanisms against those countries. Catherine Amirfar et al., From
NAFTA to USMCA: Main Changes to the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System,
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON (May 7, 2020), https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/
2020/05/from-nafta-to-usmca-main-changes-to-the-investor
[https://perma.cc/DC29-
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acted as a trilateral investment treaty between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. 25
Three primary goals motivate nations to enter into BITs: foreign
investment protection, market liberalization, and foreign market
promotion. 26 The first two goals work largely in the interest of the
investors of the developed nation, while the third goal primarily
benefits the investee developing nation. 27 The “grand bargain” of
BITs is that, if a developing nation enters into a BIT creating
protections and a hospitable environment for foreign investors, the
developing nation will benefit by receiving an increase of foreign
capital invested in the State. 28 The foreign investor then benefits by
having access to previously inaccessible 29 or high risk markets that
it could not or did not feel comfortable investing in prior to the
creation of the BIT. 30 When the protections of BITs are either not
enforced or simply “contracted around” by agreements between
private parties, the concern is that the grand bargain comes undone;
foreign investors no longer feel comfortable investing in the
developing nation and the developing nation no longer enjoys the
benefits of capital coming from foreign investors.
III. International Arbitration
The word arbitration may send up red flags to readers who
immediately think of big corporations sneaking arbitration clauses
into fine print, forcing helpless customers to resolve disputes
through the corporation’s specially created arbitration system.
International arbitral tribunals, however, operate quite differently
and may in fact provide a more equitable alternative to adjudication
of international investment disputes in State courts.
Established in 1966 by the ICSID Convention, 31 ICSID is an

SC4Y].
Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 74.
Id. at 68.
27 See id. at 75–77.
28 See id. at 77.
29 Id. at 76 (arguing that BITs facilitate the entry and operation of investments by
inducing host countries to remove various impediments in their regulatory systems).
30 See id. at 77.
31 Formally known as the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention].
25
26
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independent dispute-settlement institution specifically devoted to
international investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”). 32 A
dispute is typically heard by a panel of three arbitrators: one
arbitrator chosen by each of the parties and a third arbitrator to serve
as President of the Tribunal, either (1) agreed upon by both parties,
or (2) appointed by the Secretary-General of ICSID. 33 The tribunal
operates very much like a court, hearing evidence and legal
arguments from both parties before reaching its binding,
enforceable decision. 34 While ICSID exclusively hears investment
disputes, parties entering into international contracts may (and often
do) include an arbitration clause for one of the dozens of arbitral
institutions that operate around the globe which are competent to
hear all claims arising out of international disputes. 35
Resolving an international investment dispute in arbitration
provides many advantages over having a dispute heard in domestic
courts. The first and most obvious is that arbitration presents an
opportunity for parties to have a dispute settled in a neutral forum. 36
Parties in arbitration are encouraged to choose a third-party forum
(i.e., not the home State of either party) and most institutions require
their arbitrators to sign a declaration of independence and
impartiality. 37 Arbitrations tend to be resolved more quickly than
disputes in court—the average length of arbitral proceedings is
twenty-four months 38 and there is no system for appeal. 39
32 About ICSID, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/E9LC-2GZS] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
33 See Number of Arbitrators, supra note 3.
34 See About ICSID, supra note 32.
35 Juris International - Dispute Resolution Centres, INT’L TRADE CTR.,
http://www.intracen.org/itc/trade-support/arbitration-and-mediation/
[https://perma.cc/XG9M-M7QY] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (listing 175 institutions
around the globe that offer commercial arbitration, mediation, conciliation, and other
alternative dispute resolution services).
36 Guy Robin, The Advantages and Disadvantages of International Commercial
Arbitration, 2014 INT’L BUS. L.J. 131, 138 (2014).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 137.
39 ICSID has no formal system of appeal. However, if a party believes that the
tribunal has erred, it may request a supplementary decision, rectification, revision, or
annulment. See Post-Award Remedies - ICSID Convention Arbitration, ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Post-Award-Remedies-ConventionArbitration.aspx [https://perma.cc/FQS9-VNC7] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). For
comparison, civil cases in the U.S. district court have a median length of 27 months from
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Further, the process itself is tailored to meet businesses’ needs. 40
For example, for businesses who want to keep scientific know-how
or a strategic interest out of the public eye, arbitration is a private,
confidential method to resolve business disputes. 41 The lack of
interference by the press and the public allows the parties to focus
on the merits of the dispute and thus preserve future business
relations. 42 Finally, arbitral awards are much more easily
enforceable than judgments from domestic courts, as the New York
Convention provides that an arbitral award may be recognized and
enforced in the domestic courts of any of the 166 signatories to the
Convention. 43 ICSID arbitral awards are particularly attractive to
investors because, since ICSID is affiliated with the World Bank
Group, a host State is more likely to comply with an ICSID award
as failure to comply may jeopardize the State’s access to World
Bank funding or international credit generally. 44 That is not to say
that arbitration is a faultless alternative to international litigation,
but that it provides a method to avoid many of the problems
presented by adjudication of such cases in domestic courts, as

filing to the start of a trial, with roughly 10% of cases pending for more than three years.
See CONG. RES. SERVS., LAWSUITS AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: BASIC FEDERAL
COURT PROCEDURE AND TIMELINES 1 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11349.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8A76-BLCC]. An appeal to a federal circuit court on average takes
another ten months. See U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS SUMMARY – 12-MONTH
PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2020 2 (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/data_tables/fcms_na_appsumary0930.2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EY9C-Z5ZK].
Thus, on average, assuming two parties commence an action on the same date, the party
who submits a dispute to international arbitration will have its dispute completely resolved
before a party who submits its dispute to a U.S. district court has even begun trial.
40 Robin, supra note 36, at 136.
41 Id.; Publication of ICSID Decisions and Awards with the Parties’ Consent, ICSID
(May 5, 2010), https://icsid.worldbank.org/news-and-events/news-releases/publicationicsid-decisions-and-awards-parties-consent [https://perma.cc/Y2RV-SHBD] [hereinafter
Publication of ICSID Decisions] (noting that consent of both parties is required for
publication of ICSID decisions).
42 Robin, supra note 36, at 136.
43 New York Convention, supra note 5. The New York Convention’s website reports
that, as of 2020, 166 nations are party to the convention. See Contracting States – List of
Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/
list+of+contracting+states [https://perma.cc/5JTV-6X3C] (last visited Dec. 15, 2020).
44 Glossary:
Umbrella
Clause,
THOMSON
REUTERS
PRAC.
L.,
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-519-0939?transitionType=Default&context
Data=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true [https://perma.cc/FSZ7-GH6K?type=image] (last
visited Dec. 15, 2020).
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discussed infra Part IV.
A. ICSID Jurisdiction
As of 2020, 155 States have ratified the ICSID Convention. 45
Article 25(1) of the Convention provides:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State
(or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another
Contracting State[.] 46

Article 25(3) of the Convention adds that consent by a
constituent subdivision or agency of a State requires approval of that
State, unless the State notifies the Centre that no such approval is
required. 47 However, signing the ICSID convention on its own
cannot amount to consent to ICSID jurisdiction by the parties in an
ICSID dispute, since an ICSID arbitral dispute is not between
States, but between a host State and a foreign investor. 48 Therefore,
it has become common practice to consent to ICSID jurisdiction
through a BIT. 49 Ninety-three percent of BITs contain language
about ISDS, with ninety percent of those treaties mentioning ICSID
as either the exclusive or a permissible forum for ISDS. 50
In addition to the jurisdictional requirements of Article 25(1)
and (3) and consent via a BIT, international arbitral tribunals also
have limited subject matter, or rationae materiae, jurisdiction.51
45 For a complete list of signatory and contracting states, see About ICSID: Database
of ICSID Member States, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/about/memberstates/database-of-member-states [https://perma.cc/Q2T2-Q68C] (last visited Dec. 12,
2020) (reporting that 163 countries have signed the ICSID Convention and that 155
countries have ratified it).
46 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, art. 25(1).
47 Id. art. 25(3).
48 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. (“UNCTAD”), DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 2.3 CONSENT TO
ARBITRATION 17 (2003), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/edmmisc23
2add2_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E95-ANJD].
49 Id.
50 OECD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 18–19 (showing that approximately 90% of
treaties containing ISDS provisions mention ICSID, while another 60% mention ad hoc
tribunals under UNCITRAL rules).
51 Katia Yannaca-Small, OECD Working Papers on International Investment
2006/03: Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, OECD PUBL’G
3 (Oct. 2006), https://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/WP-
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This means that an arbitral tribunal is not necessarily competent to
hear any claim arising out of an investment agreement. Rather, the
tribunal may only hear treaty claims—those claims arising from the
violation of protections guaranteed by the BIT. 52 For investors, this
typically means bringing an expropriation claim (as this is the most
common protection afforded by BITs, often earning its own clause
in a BIT), 53 or a claim for violation of the standard(s) of protection
guaranteed by the BIT. 54 The most common standards contained in
BITs include: protection against expropriation, fair and equitable
treatment, national treatment, and most-favored nation treatment. 55
Therefore, under ordinary circumstances, a foreign investor cannot
simply sue a State for breach of contract if the State fails to fulfill
its obligations under the contract. Instead, the foreign investor must
characterize its harm either as an expropriation or as a failure to
meet the standard(s) of protection as guaranteed by the BIT for an
ICSID tribunal to have jurisdiction to hear the claim. 56
B. Umbrella Clauses
While early models of BITs typically only provided for
protection against expropriation, more recent BITs tend to allow
parties to bring a greater variety of claims under the BIT. 57 It has
become common practice among certain nations to include an
umbrella clause in their BITs. 58 Umbrella clauses are broadlywritten clauses that act as a catch-all provision to pursue claims

2006_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/UC4A-BETR].
52 See id.
53 See generally OECD SURVEY, supra note 2 (noting throughout the report that
information about ISDS remedies in BITs is typically found either in an expropriation
clause or in a separate ISDS clause).
54 Ezgi Ceren Aydoğmuş, Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BIT”) and Standards of
Protection in Energy Sector, HERDEM ATT’YS AT L. (Aug. 2, 2015), available at
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=91a5d19b-63e5-427d-ba45b3f7a533fea2 [https://perma.cc/K79C-P9JH].
55 See id. (providing more information on these standards and the different levels of
protection they guarantee).
56 Yannaca-Small, supra note 51, at 3.
57 See OECD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 8 (“Of low frequency in the sample is a first
category of treaties (mostly early treaties) that only provide access to domestic courts, and
only to bring claims arising under the expropriation clause.”).
58 See Yannaca-Small, supra note 51, at 5–6.
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where a host State’s actions might not normally breach the BIT. 59
While violating a contract would not ordinarily invoke treaty
protection under international law, the presence of an umbrella
clause in a BIT can elevate a contract claim to the level of a treaty
claim, meaning that an investor should in theory be able to bring a
breach-of-contract claim before an international arbitral body like
ICSID. 60
Of the roughly 2,500 BITs currently in existence, approximately
forty percent contain an umbrella clause. 61 Certain nations tend to
favor the inclusion of umbrella clauses in their BITs, including
Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Germany. 62
The language and appearance of umbrella clauses varies, 63 but an
example appears in Article 8(2) of the Germany-Turkmenistan BIT:
Each Contracting State shall observe any other obligation that it
may have entered into with regard to investments in its territory
by nationals or companies of the other Contracting State. 64

Because a contract between a German corporation and the
Turkmen State (or vice-versa) fits within the broad language of
Article 8(2), an ICSID tribunal should in theory have jurisdiction to
hear both traditional BIT claims as well as any other claims arising
out of investor-State contracts.
IV. Issues of Domestic Adjudication
A. Prejudice Against Foreign Parties
Lawyers and legislators have long recognized a certain “home
field advantage” for those parties having their case heard on their
own turf. The American government recognized this issue early in
the nation’s history and addressed it by including a provision in the
Glossary: Umbrella Clause, supra note 44.
Id.
61 OECD SURVEY, supra note 2, at 5.
62 Id. (reporting that while certain nations tend to favor umbrella clauses, others, such
as France, Australia, Japan, and Canada, tend to draft BITs without umbrella clauses).
63 See id. at 4–5 (demonstrating several ways an umbrella clause might be phrased).
64 Treaty Between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Government of Turkmenistan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, Germ.-Turkmenistan, art. 8(2), opened for signature Aug. 28, 1997
(entered into force Feb. 19, 2001), (quoting the English translation of the BIT, available
at https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/laws/italaw11244.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8CAY-QZU6]).
59
60
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U.S. Constitution allowing diverse parties to file in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction 65 to prevent bias towards the local party
in state court. 66 If the framers of the Constitution were worried
about preference in the courts for Americans from one state over
Americans from a neighboring state, imagine how the problem
becomes exacerbated when the parties hail from different nations.
Additionally, because all ICSID cases by definition arise from a
dispute with a State or State-owned entity, the battle is not just
between citizens of different nations; it is a battle between a foreign
citizen and the government in whose courts it is seeking a remedy. 67
In addition to overcoming the simple prejudice of being an
“other,” investors who do business with developing nations may be
forced to bear the burden of political tensions working against them
in the courtroom. A prime illustration of this issue occurred in the
aftermath of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In 1979, Islamic
organizations overthrew the American-backed Shah of Iran and
installed a theocratic government that was openly anti-American. 68
A large number of American businesses and investors had contracts
with the Iranian government that they did not or could not perform
after the revolution. 69 Many American companies were forced to
leave their assets behind or had them seized by the Iranian
government and in retaliation, the United States seized any Iranian
assets that it could. 70 This created a legal standoff; parties from the
65 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Controversies
between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between
Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.”).
66 Linda S. Mullenix, Creative Manipulation of Federal Jurisdiction: Is There
Diversity After Death, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1012 n.7 (1985) (“The often articulated
rationale for diversity jurisdiction is to prevent state court prejudice against out-of-state
litigants.”)
67 See Robin, supra note 36, at 138.
68 See Janet Afary, Iranian Revolution, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
event/Iranian-Revolution [https://perma.cc/Y4YQ-FJP7] (last updated Sept. 20, 2019).
69 See, e.g., Am. Bell Int’l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The action arises from the recent revolution in Iran and its impact upon
contracts made with the ousted Imperial Government of Iran[.]”); Harris Corp. v. Nat’l
Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982).
70 See Suzanne Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, IRAN PRIMER,
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-economy
[https://perma.cc/PGW3BKEP] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (“Iran’s constraints intensified after the November
1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, when Washington froze approximately $11
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United States were unwilling to file suit in Iran and vice versa,
because parties from both nations recognized the extreme political
prejudice they would face in the other nation’s courts.
The problem was only resolved by the creation of the U.S.-Iran
Claims Tribunal, an arbitral tribunal mediated by Algeria, a neutral
third party, to ensure that parties from both nations could have their
claims heard without prejudice by an independent, non-prejudicial
tribunal— 71 sound familiar?
B. Lack of Access to Counsel
For investors with enough capital and connections to expand to
foreign markets, it may seem that finding legal counsel or
representation to assist them in proceedings before domestic courts
would not pose much of an issue. However, it is the unfortunate
reality that in some countries, lawyers may refuse to represent a
party opposing the government in court. This tends to be more
prevalent in countries like Turkmenistan, 72 where the head of state
rules with relatively unlimited power, citizens may have limited
access to information or free speech, and governments are known
perpetrators of human rights violations. 73
In Unionmatex, the company alleged that when the project got
behind schedule due to failures on the part of the Turkmen
government, the officials onsite “appeared to fear political and
personal consequences from their negligence and interference and
therefore reported that Unionmatex was to blame.” 74 The company
was initially able to obtain local representation, but “it is alleged
that its lawyer resigned in response to government pressure.” 75
Unionmatex is neither the first nor the only case in which a
billion in Iranian assets and imposed other sanctions.”).
71 See About the Tribunal, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB., https://www.iusct.net/
Pages/Public/A-About.aspx [https://perma.cc/F75W-AA4F] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
72 This paper will frequently use Turkmenistan as an example to show the issues
inherent in adjudicating investment disputes in developing countries. That is not to say
Turkmenistan is the only country where these problems exist or these issues are implicated.
At least some of these issues will be present in any given case where claims are adjudicated
in a remote, developing nation with a weak legal system.
73 See Kiliç Ĭnşaat Ĭthalat Ĭhracat Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1, Award, ¶¶ 4.3.5–4.3.21 (July 2, 2013) (elaborating on the
various reports providing evidence that Turkmenistan lacks an independent judiciary).
74 Ross, supra note 10.
75 Id.
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foreign investor was unable to find local representation for its case
in Turkmenistan. The claimant in the 2013 ICSID case Kiliç Ĭnşaat
Ĭthalat Ĭhracat Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan 76
alleged similar issues to those in Unionmatex:
Claimant contends in its submissions that it was unable to find a
single Turkmen lawyer who was willing to testify against the
government of Turkmenistan. It is said that, on each occasion the
refusal was followed by the same explanation: a fear for the
security of the lawyer and his/her family of reprisals by
Respondent. Claimant also submits it has communicated about
this with other investors with claims against Respondent and
understands that its experience is universal. 77

Even if an investor seeks to litigate its claim in a remote
developing nation where the level of corruption does not rise quite
to the level of that seen in Kiliç, the investor may still be
disadvantaged by having to bring on local counsel to litigate. An
investor will be most comfortable working with a law firm with
which it already has a strong business relationship and which is
already familiar with the investor’s operations and needs, or
alternatively, a firm with an office located nearby whose lawyers
speak the investor’s language. However, in cases adjudicated in faroff developing countries, investors must settle for representation by
local counsel with whom they may have no relationship or past
dealings. 78 In this situation, investors and their lawyers may run
into linguistic and cultural barriers when communicating with local
counsel, or may have no way of determining the quality or
trustworthiness of counsel in the developing nation. 79 Alternatively,
in ICSID disputes, the investor may be able to use its ordinary goto law firm—if that firm has an international arbitration practice
group—or at least be represented by a firm that specializes in
international arbitration, has an office located near the investor, and

ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1.
Kiliç, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1, Award, at ¶ 4.3.12.
78 See, e.g., Steven C. Nelson, International Commercial Arbitration, 24 INT’L L.
599, 602 (1990) (describing a case in which one party needed to involve local counsel on
issues related to Barbados law).
79 See generally Anna Stolley Persky, The New World: Despite Globalization of the
Economy, Lawyers Are Finding New Barriers to Practice on Foreign Soil, 97 A.B.A. J.
34, 38 (2011) (explaining the difficulties of working with and finding qualified local
counsel in international disputes).
76
77
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speaks the investor’s language. 80
C. Lack of Access to Law
In addition to the difficulty of finding counsel to represent them,
investors may also run into difficulty finding out what the law of a
developing nation is. This problem may arise as early as the signing
of the contract. If the investor is presented with a choice-of-law
clause for, say, Turkmen law, or a forum selection clause for the
Turkmen courts (most likely submitting itself to Turkmen law), 81
the investor may have no way of figuring out what substantive law
it has in fact bound itself to. 82 This is not entirely the fault of the
investor—translations of the laws of the developing nation might
not be available in any widely-spoken language.
Say, for example, that an investor is presented with a contract
that selects Turkmen law and wants to research the law before
signing. The official language of Turkmenistan is Turkmen, 83 and
as such the constitution and all codes of law are written in
Turkmen. 84 Microsoft Translator currently offers translation

80 Many of the world’s top arbitration firms have offices located all over the world,
especially in the wealthy, developed nations that investors in ICSID disputes tend to call
home. See Best Law Firms for International Arbitration – Commercial, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., https://bestlawfirms.usnews.com/international-arbitration-commercial
[https://perma.cc/C9CN-7RLX] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
81 This is because a forum selection clause for one jurisdiction also tends to
accompanied by a choice-of-law clause selecting the law of that jurisdiction. In the case
that a contract includes a forum selection clause but fails to include a choice-of-law clause,
the prevailing view is to apply the law of the forum. See Coyle, supra note 16, at 1793–94
n.5 (2019).
82 Robin, supra note 36, at 138 (“A foreign company will be put at a disadvantage
over the ‘home party’ when faced with a complex legal and court system; in these
circumstances, it may be difficult for a foreign party to have access to information about
the local law and this party may thus be impeded from fully grasping the risks that it is
exposed to.”).
83 People and Society: Turkmenistan, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELL. AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tx.html
[https://
perma.cc/YJT8-V25G] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [hereinafter People and Society]
(reporting that Turkmen is the official language of Turkmenistan, with 72% of the
population speaking the language).
84 See, e.g.¸ Türkmenistanyň Konstitusiýasy [Constitution of Turkmenistan], HUKUK
MAGLUMATLARY MERKEZI [LEGAL INFO. CTR.], http://www.minjust.gov.tm/tm/
mmerkezi/doc_view.php?doc_id=8124 [https://perma.cc/QG2R-4PM3] (last updated
Nov. 1, 2019).
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between eighty world languages, 85 but it does not offer translation
of Turkmen. 86 Google Translate just added Turkmen to its list of
translatable languages in 2020. 87 Fortunately, as Russian is
Turkmenistan’s second most widely-spoken language, 88 a variety of
legal resources are also available in Russian and are thus more
readily translatable, both by automatic web translation services and
official translators. 89
If the investor wants an English translation of the Turkmen
Code, Wolters Kluwer currently sells a hardcopy print version of
the Code on its website. 90 This publication is not an official English
translation of the code, and the website description warns that there
are parts of the law which are inconsistent depending on whether
the Turkmen or Russian translation is used. 91 This may be the best
(and perhaps only) way for the investor to try to determine what the
law of Turkmenistan is before submitting itself to the law in a
contract. Therefore, it may be difficult even for an investor who
conducts due diligence or for a lawyer with experience in foreign
legal research to figure out what the laws of certain remote,
developing nations are. Further, as can be seen from the dealings
of foreign investors in Turkmenistan, laws on paper do not
necessarily translate into laws in practice for developing nations
with weak legal systems. 92
85 Including two dialects of Klingon, a fictional language from the Star Trek
universe.
86 See MICROSOFT TRANSLATOR, https://www.bing.com/translator [https://perma.cc/
65BA-GYRF] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
87 Nick Statt, Google Translate Supports New Languages for the First Time in Four
Years, Including Uyghur, VERGE (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/
2020/2/26/21154417/google-translate-new-languages-support-odia-tatar-turkmenuyghur-kinyarwanda [https://perma.cc/8TBQ-R92F].
88 People and Society, supra note 83 (reporting Russian as Turkmenistan’s secondmost spoken language, with 12% of the population speaking the language).
89 See generally Индекс [Index], ЦЕНТР ПРАВ ИНФОРМАЦИИ [INFO. RTS. CTR.],
http://www.minjust.gov.tm/ru/mmerkezi/index.php [https://perma.cc/428V-ZM5L] (last
updated Nov. 1, 2019) (offering translations of the Turkmen constitution and various codes
of law in both Russian and Turkmen).
90 Turkmenistan Civil Code of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, WOLTERS KLUWER,
https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/store/product/turkmenistan-civil-code-of-saparmuratturkmenbashi/ [https://perma.cc/Y3BS-QW7F] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
91 Id.
92 Compare TÜRKMENISTANYŇ RAÝAT KODEKSI [CIVIL CODE] art. 10 (Turkm.)
(guaranteeing various judicial protections for civil rights, including the right to an appeal),
with Ballantyne, supra note 8 (reporting that Unionmatex faced various barriers in the
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V. Solutions
A. Just Stop Signing These Contracts 93
Of course, the easiest and most intuitive way to not be bound by
a forum selection clause is to never sign a contract that contains one.
While this is a valid point, the reality is that parties continue to sign
these agreements and do not show any signs of stopping. 94 The
Turkmen domestic courts, including that its request for an appeal was ignored).
93 While in Japan, I once spilled a bucket of water onto a tatami (woven straw) mat
floor. A frantic online search for “what to do when you spill water on tatami” turned up a
series of articles that all advised in some form, “whatever you do, don’t ever spill water on
tatami.” While it should be clear by now that the easiest way to avoid forum selection
clauses is to never sign contracts that contain them, the primary purpose of this article is
to explore the options of parties who have already entered into such contracts and for
arbitrators who encounter such contracts.
94 Investment Treaty Arbitration Law, a popular database for investment-related
arbitral decisions, shows that at least ten investment arbitration disputes dealing with
contracts containing forum selection clauses have been published since 2018. Because
both parties must consent for an arbitral award to be published, it is likely that the number
of cases heard involving forum selection clauses is much, much higher. See INT’L ARB.
L., https://www.italaw.com/ [https://perma.cc/MF3G-JPLT] (last visited Dec. 14, 2020);
Publication of ICSID Decisions, supra note 41. For recent, published international arbitral
cases involving forum selection clauses, see Anglo Am. PLC v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/14/1, Award, ¶ 214 (Jan. 18, 2019) (involving a mining
concession contract containing an exclusive forum selection clause for the courts of
Venezuela); Glencore Fin. (Berm.) Ltd v. Plurinational State of Bol., UNCITRAL PCA
Case No. 2016-39/AA641, Claimant’s Rejoinder on Jurisdictional Objections, ¶¶ 248–49
(Jan. 20, 2019) (involving contracts containing mandatory ICC arbitration clauses);
Belenergia S.A. v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/40, Award, ¶ 157 (Aug. 6,
2019) (involving a forum selection clause conferring jurisdiction upon Rome courts);
Greentech Energy Sys. A/S et al. v. The Italian Republic, SCC Arbitration V (2015/095),
Final Award, ¶ 214 (Dec. 23, 2018) (involving contacts containing exclusive forum
selection clauses for the Court of Rome); Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. (Japan) v. The Republic
of India, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2017-37, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 219 (Apr. 29,
2019) (involving a contract calling for Chennai, India as the exclusive forum for dispute
resolution); Glencore Int’l A.G. & C.I. Prodeco S.A. v. Republic of Colom., ICSID Case
No. ABR/16/6, Award, ¶ 948 (Aug. 2, 2019) (involving a mining concession contract
containing a forum selection clause for the Colombian courts); CMC Muratori Cementisti
CMC Di Ravenna SOC. Coop. et al. v. Republic of Mozam., ICSID Case No. ARB/17/39,
Award, ¶ 237 (Oct. 24, 2019) (involving a forum selection clause for a tribunal constituted
pursuant to the Cotonou Convention Arbitration Rules); Casinos Austria Int’l GmbH &
Casinos Austria Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Caso No. ARB/14/32,
Decision on Jurisdiction (June 29, 2018) (involving a forum selection clause for the courts
of the Province of Salta, Italy); Gavrilović & Gavrilović d.o.o. v. Republic of Croat.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/39, Award, ¶ 416 n.575 (July 26, 2018) (involving a forum
selection clause providing for resolution of disputes in the Regional Commercial Court in
Zagreb); Unión Fenosa Gas, S.A. V. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/4,
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reasons for parties entering into these contracts are varied and may
depend on the unique facts of each individual case.
As seen in Unionmatex, many of the disputes that end up in front
of ICSID tribunals arise out of contracts worth millions of dollars
that were entered into after a lengthy and competitive bidding
process. 95 Perhaps investors who have won a contract through a
bidding war feel that their negotiating power is limited and that the
government may move on to the next lowest bidder should the
winning company push too hard for terms in the contract that are
overly favorable to the investor. Investors might also not appreciate
the gravity of signing a forum selection clause for a foreign
jurisdiction. 96
The courts of the world are as diverse as the countries that host
them, 97 and there is no database or objective ranking system to tell
parties which nations’ judicial systems they can and cannot trust.98

Award, ¶ 3.18 (Aug. 31, 2018) (involving a Sale and Purchase Agreement containing a
mandatory arbitration clause for resolution of disputes in accordance with the Arbitration
Rules of the Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration [CRCICA
Arbitration]).
95 Unionmatex’s €144 million contract was the result of winning a 2008 public
tender, a bidding war for a contract from a public sector organization. See Ballantyne,
supra note 8 (“The company says it was directly invited to bid by the Turkmen government
and that its selection as winner of the tender was personally approved by President
Berdimuhamedow.”).
96 Both because they might over-estimate the reliability of the courts they submit
themselves to, or because they believe that those treaty claims guaranteed by the BIT, such
as the protection against expropriation, will not be subject to any choice-of-forum
clause(s). For an extended discussion of the latter, see infra Part V.C.
97 WORLD
JUST. PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2019 8 (2019),
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/ROLI-2019-Reduced.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48YT-HZHR] (“The Index has been designed to be applied in countries
with vastly different social, cultural, economic, and political systems. No society has ever
attained—let alone sustained—a perfect realization of the rule of law. Every country faces
the perpetual challenge of building and renewing the structures, institutions, and norms
that can support and sustain a rule of law culture.”).
98 Currently, the closest thing to such a database is the World Justice Project’s Rule
of Law Index. While the compilation is one step in the right direction, the publishers
themselves acknowledge that “the rule of law is notoriously difficult to define and
measure.” The report is designed to look at the experience of an everyday citizen in each
country, placing weight on individual testimony related to topics like the nation’s ability
to control crime. These factors likely have little impact on a wealthy overseas investor and
as such, the report is not a dependable reference for determining a nation’s investment
climate. Additionally, the report is incomplete, containing data for only 126 countries.
Reports for many African, Middle Eastern, and Central Asian countries (including
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Additionally, the definition of what an “equitable” system looks like
may differ depending on who you ask. 99 Finally, if two parties have
had prior successful dealings in the past, the investor may be less
hesitant to sign a contract with a forum selection clause if it feels
that there is a low risk that the other party will breach. However,
the focus of this paper is not to elaborate on the many reasons why
investors should not sign contracts containing forum selection
clauses or to try to justify the actions of those who do. Instead, this
paper aims to present and analyze the different routes that an
investor who has signed such a contract or an arbitrator who finds
herself arbitrating a dispute involving such a contract may pursue to
ultimately achieve an equitable outcome.
B. Flexible Interpretation 100
Drafting a quality forum selection clause is somewhat of an art,
and a poorly worded contract may present an opportunity to wiggle
around or out of an unfavorable forum selection clause. This can be
done by reading the clause as either (1) non-exclusive or (2) limited
in its scope. 101
In order for a clause to be read as exclusive, it must contain
certain words indicating that the forum listed in the contract is the
only forum in which claims may be brought. 102 A mandatory forum
selection clause must contain language that indicates exclusivity,
such as “sole,” “only,” “exclusive,” or “must.” 103 With less of a

Turkmenistan) are notoriously absent. See id. at 7–8, 17.
99 Even the U.S. judicial system, which is considered by many to be a highly
developed legal system, is frowned upon in many European countries for its use of jury
trials, which some see as being unreliable. See The Jury Is Out, ECONOMIST (Feb. 12,
2009), https://www.economist.com/international/2009/02/12/the-jury-is-out [https://
perma.cc/8S4T-V6HA] (“Britain, the supposed mother of trial by jury, is seeking to scrap
them for serious fraud and to ban juries from some inquests.”).
100 Note that the interpretive rules explained here are American interpretive rules.
While other jurisdictions likely have similar rules in effect, there is no guarantee that
foreign courts will interpret contract language exactly as U.S. courts do.
101 See Coyle, supra note 16, at 1795.
102 Id. at 1799.
103 Id. at 1800 (“Courts . . . will look for certain ‘magic words’ that signal the parties’
intent to litigate their disputes in the chosen forum to the exclusion of all other possible
venues. The words ‘exclusive’ or ‘sole’ are generally recognized to convey this intent.
Statements that a claim ‘must’ be brought in a particular forum or that it may ‘only’ be
brought in that forum also suffice.”).
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consensus, some courts have interpreted the terms “shall” 104 and
“venue” 105 to indicate a mandatory forum selection clause. 106 If the
contract in question contains one or more of these terms, it will be
difficult for either party to argue that the forum selection clause is
non-exclusive.
However, if a contract’s drafter neglected to include one of these
terms, a forum selection clause may instead be read as being
“permissive.” 107 A permissive forum selection clause contains
phrases like “the court shall have jurisdiction” or “the parties
consent to venue.” 108 Rather than mandating the forum in which a
case must be brought, a permissive clause is understood instead to
indicate a party’s consent to jurisdiction or venue in the specific
forum. This means that the forum selection clause, rather than
mandating that the forum is the only place where a case can be
brought, is instead read as the party agreeing to submit to the
jurisdiction of the forum, making it one permissive place in which
a case may be brought. 109 While such clauses on their face may
appear to signal binding forum selection, a party presented with a
permissive clause may be able to argue its way out of a problematic
forum and into a different forum of its choice.
Even if a forum selection clause contains exclusive language
making it binding, if the clause is not properly worded, it may still
be found to be limited in its scope. 110 U.S. courts have held that a
clause referring to disputes “which arise out of this agreement” or
“arising hereunder” are limited in their scope and extend only to

104 See Slater v. Energy Servs. Grp. Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1326, 1328–30 (11th Cir.
2011) (holding the term shall as one of requirement). But see Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v.
Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 76–77 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the language “[t]he
courts of California shall have jurisdiction . . . ” did not indicate a mandatory forum
selection clause).
105 Gita Sports v. SG Sensortechnik GmbH & Co. KG, 560 F. Supp. 2d 432, 436
(W.D.N.C. 2008) (“A crucial distinction between a mandatory clause and a permissive
clause ‘is whether the clause only mentions jurisdiction or specifically refers to venue.’”)
(quoting Scotland Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Integrated Informatics, Inc., No. Civ.
1:02CV00796, 2003 WL 151852, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2003)).
106 Coyle, supra note 16, at 1801.
107 Id. at 1802.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See id. at 1803.
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contract claims. 111 However, carefully worded forum selection
clauses containing phrases like “all claims or causes of action
relating to or arising from this agreement” or “any case or
controversy arising under or in connection with this agreement” are
broad enough in their scope to cover non-contract claims, such as
tort claims. 112 In the context of international investment disputes,
an arbitral tribunal may find that an investor is bound to resolve
contract disputes according to an exclusive forum selection
clause. 113 However, if the exclusive clause is not worded broadly
enough with respect to its scope, the investor may be able to bring
other, non-contract claims in another forum of its choice.
C. Treat the Arbitration Provisions of BITs as NonWaivable 114
As explained supra Part III.A, BITs typically extend a number
of protections to both parties, such as the protection against
expropriation without compensation and a guarantee of certain
standards of protection. 115 A forum selection clause, no matter how
cleverly worded, will generally not be interpreted as eliminating a
tribunal’s jurisdiction over those treaty claims enumerated in the
Id. at 1805.
Coyle, supra note 16, at 1804.
113 See, e.g., Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal (formerly
Compagnie Générale des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
Award, ¶ 79 (Nov. 21, 2000).
114 The interplay between choice-of-forum provisions, ICSID jurisdiction, BITs, as
well as the characterization of treaty versus contract claims, and the role and interpretation
of umbrella clauses in ISDS is a complicated and highly specialized area of international
arbitration law which many a more qualified author has explored in depth. See generally,
e.g., Jude Antony, Umbrella Clauses Since SGS v Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines – A
Developing Consensus, 29 ARB. INT’L 607 (2013); Stephen Donnelly, Conflicting ForumSelection Agreements in Treaty and Contract, 69 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 759 (2020); Mary E.
Footer, Umbrella Clauses and Widely-Formulated Arbitration Clauses: Discerning the
Limits of ICSID Jurisdiction, 16 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 87 (2017). This
author does not purport to be an expert on this subject, nor does this section purport to
provide an exhaustive or authoritative history of relevant ICSID decisions. Rather than
serving as a practical guide, this section seeks to explore the normative implications of
several well-known ICSID decisions relating to the issue of choice-of-forum clauses and
ICSID jurisdiction.
115 See Aydoğmuş, supra note 54; Ross, supra note 10 (“[Unionmatex] accuses
Turkmenistan of the deliberate breach of various protections in the BIT including the
protection against expropriation without compensation and against unfair and inequitable
treatment . . . ”).
111
112
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BIT. 116 In the case that Unionmatex is found bound to resolve any
and all breach of contract claims it has in the Turkmen courts, it
should in theory still be able to seek a remedy in front of an arbitral
tribunal if it can successfully characterize Turkmenistan’s actions
as treaty violations under the Germany-Turkmenistan BIT. 117
However, in certain similar cases, investors have been unable to
bring their treaty claims in front of an ICSID tribunal because of a
forum selection clause contained in a private contract granting
exclusive jurisdiction to domestic courts. Vivendi v. Argentine
Republic, 118 another case involving the “novel and complex
issue . . . relating to the interplay of a bilateral investment treaty, a
Concession Contract with a forum-selection clause and the ICSID
Convention[,]” provides an example of the injustice Unionmatex
may face depending on the decision of the ICSID tribunal. 119
Similar to Unionmatex, Vivendi involved a multi-million dollar
concession contract between a foreign investor and a State entity,
(in the case of Vivendi, the Argentine provincial government). 120
After its relationship with the Argentine government soured, the
French investor in Vivendi sought a remedy from an ICSID tribunal
under the Argentine-French BIT, alleging various violations of the
BIT and the concession contract. 121 Article 8 of the ArgentineFrench BIT deals generally with disputes “relating to investments
made under this Agreement between one Contracting Party and an
investor of the other Contracting Party[,]” 122 though scholars are
inconclusive as to whether this language constitutes an umbrella
clause. 123
See Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 79.
See id.; see also Garanti Koza v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No ARB/11/20,
Award, ¶ 245 (Dec. 19, 2016) (“The fact that the Contract provides for resolution of
disputes arising under the Contract in the Arbitration Court of Turkmenistan does not
deprive this Tribunal of jurisdiction over claims pleaded and arising under the BIT.”).
118 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Vivendi Universal (formerly
Compagnie Générale des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3.
119 Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 95.
120 See id. ¶ 9.
121 Id.
122 Id. ¶ 55 (quoting Article 8(1) of the Argentina – France BIT).
123 Argentina – France BIT (1991), UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB (Mar. 2016),
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/bit/127/
argentina---france-bit-1991- [https://perma.cc/J3HB-F8U7] (reporting that it is
“inconclusive” whether the Argentine-French BIT contains an umbrella clause).
116
117
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In its findings on jurisdiction, the tribunal held that the forum
selection clause of the concession contract 124 “does not, and indeed
could not, exclude the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the BIT”
because the forum selection clause could only affect those causes of
actions deriving from the concession contract, but not those arising
under the BIT. 125 However, the tribunal went on to find that,
because all of the causes of action the investors alleged under the
BIT were “closely linked to the performance or non-performance of
the parties under the Concession Contract”:
[I]t is not possible for this Tribunal to determine which actions of
the Province were taken in exercise of its sovereign authority and
which in the exercise of its rights as a party to the Concession
Contract . . . To make such determinations the Tribunal would
have to undertake a detailed interpretation and application of the
Concession Contract, a task left by the parties to that contract to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative courts of
Tucumán. 126

Though the award in Vivendi was later challenged and partially
annulled, the outcome and logic followed in Vivendi foreshadowed
the outcome of other, similar cases of ISDS and contracts containing
forum selection clauses. 127
Indeed, several decisions since Vivendi have reached similar
124 “For purposes of interpretation and application of this Contract the parties submit
themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Contentious Administrative Tribunals of
Tucumán.” Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 27 (Nov. 21, 2000).
125 Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 14(b) (July 3,
2002).
126 Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 79.
127 The foreign investor in Vivendi later challenged the validity of the tribunal’s
decision and sought an annulment from the ICSID annulment committee. The committee
agreed that the tribunal’s refusal to interpret the concession contract constituted an excess
of power, nullifying that portion of the Vivendi decision. The committee reasoned that,
“whether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of
contract are different questions. Each of these claims will be determined by reference to
its own proper or applicable law—in the case of the BIT, by international law; in the case
of the Concession Contract, by the proper law of the contract, in other words, the law of
Tucumán.” See Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶14(d); see
also Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts Between ICSID
Decision on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 839 (2005).
However, this decision left unanswered the issue of reliance on a contractual
compromissory clause in cases “where the essential basis of a claim brought before an
international tribunal is a breach of contract.” Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 98; see also Shany supra, at 839.
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outcomes regarding the interplay between ICSID jurisdiction and
exclusive forum selection clauses contained in concession
contracts. In the 2002 case SGS v. Pakistan 128 the tribunal was asked
to consider a dispute arising under the Pakistani-Swiss BIT and a
contract containing a choice of forum clause that barred ICSID from
hearing the dispute. 129 While the tribunal entertained the Swiss
investor’s traditional treaty claims, it refused to hear any of the
company’s contract claims—despite the existence of an umbrella
clause in the BIT— 130 and upheld the Pakistani arbitrator’s
exclusive jurisdiction over those claims. 131
The following year, an ICSID tribunal took things a step further
in SGS v. Philippines, 132 a case presenting similar jurisdictional
issues to Vivendi and SGS v. Pakistan. 133 Unlike the tribunal in SGS
v. Pakistan, the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines accepted a broader
interpretation of the umbrella clause in the Swiss-Philippine BIT
(which contained virtually identical language to the one at issue in
SGS v. Pakistan) and held that the tribunal had broad jurisdiction
over both contract and treaty claims. However, channeling Vivendi,
the tribunal refused to hear the case on the merits, finding both the
128 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/13.
129 See SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 43–46 (Aug. 6, 2003).
130 “Either Contacting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the
commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the other Contracting
Party.” Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Switz.-Pak., art. 11, opened for
signature Nov. 7, 1995 (entered into force June 5, 1996), (English translation of the BIT
available at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/
treaty-files/2130/download [https://perma.cc/C5ZL-BQG8]); see also PakistanSwitzerland BIT (1995), UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB (Nov. 2016), https://investm
entpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/bit/2721/pakistan--switzerland-bit-1995- [https://perma.cc/FVX6-XUH4] (reporting that the PakistanSwitzerland BIT contains an umbrella clause).
131 See SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 166–74; see also Shany, supra note 127, at 840–41. It should
be noted that Pakistan relied heavily on the Vivendi award and subsequent annulment in
its submissions, as did the tribunal in its Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction. See
generally SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on
Objections to Jurisdiction.
132 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/6.
133 See Shany, supra note 127, at 841.
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treaty and elevated contract claims inadmissible. The tribunal ruled
that it:
‘should not exercise its jurisdiction over a contractual
claim when the parties have already agreed on how such
a claim is to be resolved, and have done so exclusively.’
Given the strong links between the contract claim and the
treaty claim (whose independent existence [the tribunal]
doubted), the majority held that it would be ‘inappropriate
and premature’ to address the treaty claim before the
contract claim had been adjudicated by the contractually
designated courts. It therefore decided to stay the ICSID
arbitration proceedings until the contract claim was sorted
out. 134

Following this same logic, in 2009 the tribunal in BIVAC v.
Paraguay 135 found that the tribunal had jurisdiction over both
traditional treaty claims and contract claims elevated to treaty-claim
status by the umbrella clause contained in the relevant BIT. 136
However, the tribunal concluded that claims arising under the
umbrella clause were inadmissible because “BIVAC cannot rely on
the Contract as the basis of a claim . . . when the Contract itself
refers that claim exclusively to another forum.” 137
In practice, this series of ICSID decisions all in some form or
another denied the ICSID tribunal jurisdiction to hear treaty claims,
despite the tribunals’ insistence that forum selection clauses in
private contracts may not be read to deprive the tribunal of its ability
to hear claims arising under the BIT. 138 This is equally concerning
134 Id. at 842 (quoting SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 155–62 (Jan. 29, 2004)).
135 Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control BIVAC B.V v.
Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. Arb/07/9.
136 BIVAC, ICSID Case No. Arb/07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ¶ 159 (May 29, 2009).
137 Id.
138 In 2013, Jude Antony published a paper surveying ICSID decisions post-SGS v.
Philippines involving umbrella clauses and their impact on ICSID jurisdiction. Antony
supra note 114, at 607. His research uncovered an emerging trend in ICSID decisions in
line with the position advocated for in the paper. Id. at 625-28 (finding one case post-SGS
v. Philippines where the tribunal held no jurisdiction because the contractual forum
selection clause took precedence (Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of
Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12), two cases where the tribunal had jurisdiction but
the claims were inadmissible (SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6; BIVAC,
ICSID Case No. Arb/07/9), and eight cases where tribunals considered their ability to hear
a claim under the umbrella clause unaffected by the presence of a contractual forum
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both in the case of traditional treaty claims and in disputes arising
out of BITs containing umbrella clauses, where ordinary contract
claims are elevated to the level of treaty claims. If an ICSID tribunal
finds that it does not have jurisdiction to hear BIT claims, or that the
tribunal has jurisdiction but that such claims are inadmissible,
parties are effectively allowed to contract around international
treaties and waive the supposedly non-waivable protections these
treaties offer. Arbitrators may address this issue by treating the right
to have treaty claims heard by an international tribunal as nonwaivable (not just in theory, but in practice) by allowing no part of
a treaty claim, whether a traditional treaty claim or a contract claim
elevated to treaty status through an umbrella clause, to be removed
from the scope of the tribunal’s decision by private contract.
D. Forum Non Conveniens
Forum non conveniens is one way in which a party may
challenge a court’s ability to hear a case, even if the contract signed
by the parties contains an exclusive forum selection clause.
Literally “an inconvenient forum,” forum non conveniens is not a
challenge to jurisdiction but rather a preliminary determination that
another, different forum is more appropriate to hear a case.139
However, for two reasons, forum non conveniens is unlikely to
selection clause in an underlying contract (SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v.
Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8; Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.
(formerly Enron Corp.) & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3; LG&E Energy Corp. et al v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1;
Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8; Salini Costruttori S.p.A.
& Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13;
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3; Sempra
Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16; Eureko B.V. v. Republic
of Poland)) (excluding non-ICSID decisions). Antony notes that, despite a strong,
developing consensus “that the jurisdiction of an international arbitral Tribunal to hear
umbrella clause claims is unaffected by the presence of a contractual forum selection
clause in an underling contract . . . there have been cases holding either that the Tribunal
did not have jurisdiction in this situation, or that it had jurisdiction but the claim was
inadmissible[.] Id. at 638. While these make up a minority of cases surveyed, “some of
these decisions are recent, and this interpretation is also supported by two of the three cases
decided since the comprehensive review conducted for this paper, so it is not possible to
dismiss this line of jurisprudence as having died out.” Id. at 638–39 (referring to the
decisions in Bosh Int’l, Inc. et al. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11; and Occidental
Petroleum Corp. et al. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11).
139 See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 428.
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provide a remedy in international investment disputes.
First, in a forum non conveniens analysis, U.S. courts 140 consider
a range of factors to determine whether the forum is proper. 141 The
court gives particular weight to “the convenience to the parties and
the practical difficulties that can attend the adjudication of a dispute
in a certain locality.” 142 Because forum selection clauses in
international investment contracts tend to select the courts of the
developing nation where the majority of the events relevant to the
dispute likely took place and where the majority of witnesses likely
reside, most courts would not feel compelled to send the case
elsewhere. 143
Second, forum non conveniens is a doctrine traditionally
recognized at common law. 144 This means that a court in the United
States, England, Canada, or another common law jurisdiction might
entertain a forum non conveniens argument, but that the courts of a
developing nation likely would not. 145 While forum non conveniens
might provide an out to a forum selection clause in other
circumstances, in the case of investment disputes like that of
Unionmatex, the doctrine is unlikely to provide any relief
whatsoever.
E. Introduce a Zapata-like Standard
When confronted with a forum selection clause in a contract, an
arbitral tribunal may look at the scope and exclusivity of the clause,
140 Note that the rules explained in this section apply specifically to U.S. courts. The
test for a forum non conveniens claim may look different in another jurisdiction.
141 See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 428.
142 Id. (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996)).
143 See generally, e.g., Unionmatex, supra note 6 (providing one such example, where
the majority of events took place in Turkmenistan, the witnesses all reside in
Turkmenistan, and the choice clauses in the contract selected both Turkmen courts and
Turkmen law).
144 See id. (describing forum non conveniens as a common law doctrine).
145 Common law jurisdictions include England and most territories that were once
British colonies, including the United States. However, as most developing nations were
not once British colonies, most do not recognize common law doctrines like forum non
conveniens. See Key Features of Common Law or Civil Law Systems, WORLD BANK GRP.,
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/legislation-regulation/frameworkassessment/legal-systems/common-vs-civil-law [https://perma.cc/LCU6-6KA8] (last
visited Nov. 24, 2019). ICSID tribunals do entertain forum non conveniens arguments.
See, e.g., Rockhopper Italia S.p.A. et al. v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/14,
Decision on the Intra-EU Jurisdictional Objection, ¶ 34 (June 26, 2019).
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but makes no inquiry into whether the clause should be enforced in
the first place. In the case of M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Company, 146 the U.S. Supreme Court developed a standard by
which to measure the equitability of enforcing a jurisdiction clause.
Under the Zapata standard, a court inquires whether a “trial in
the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient
that [the plaintiff] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his
day in court” or whether the clause should be found “invalid for
such reasons as fraud or overreaching.” 147 This sets a high standard
which may be difficult for a U.S. plaintiff arguing against a forum
selection clause for a U.S. jurisdiction to meet. 148 However, were
ICSID to adopt a similar analysis, forum selection clauses for
developing nations with weak or corrupt legal systems could
possibly be held invalid for effectively depriving parties of their
“day in court.” 149
Take Unionmatex, for example—how would a forum selection
clause for the courts of Turkmenistan hold up to a Zapata analysis?
The 2018 Human Rights Report of Turkmenistan reveals serious
problems within the nation’s judicial system. 150 The report states
that although Turkmen law provides for an independent judiciary,
in reality the branch is controlled by the executive branch; the
president has sole power to appoint and dismiss judges with no
judicial review. 151 Trials are rife with due process violations,
including failure to provide interpreters, no presumption of
innocence, a lack of independent lawyers, and general procedural
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
Id. at 15, 18.
148 In Zapata, the court went as far as to hold that it would not be overly inconvenient
for a Houston-based American company to be bound to a forum selection clause in
London. Id. at 17 (“[S]election of a London forum was clearly a reasonable effort to bring
vital certainty to this international transaction and to provide a neutral forum experienced
and capable in the resolution of admiralty litigation.”).
149 Strictly speaking, an ICSID tribunal cannot create common law. While ICSID
decisions are not binding, it is common to see one tribunal applying standards that were
created by tribunals in previous cases. One of the most common examples is the Salini test
for determining whether an investment qualifies for ICSID jurisdictional purposes. See
Salini Construttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 43–58 (July 23, 2001).
150 See U.S. DEPT. OF ST., TURKMENISTAN 2018 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 6–9 (2019),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/TURKMENISTAN-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VZR3-2DCD].
151 Id. at 6.
146
147
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violations such as not allowing a defendant’s lawyer to present
exculpatory evidence or question witnesses. 152
Generally,
Turkmenistan’s judicial branch is “widely reputed to be corrupt and
inefficient.” 153
These descriptions match closely with Unionmatex’s
experience with the Turkmen court system:
The German company says it was denied due process in the court
proceedings, having been hindered from bringing a translator to
the oral hearing. It also alleges its local legal representative
resigned from the case before the hearing following extreme
pressure from the Turkmen government. Further court actions
brought by the company failed or were ignored, it says. 154

Under these circumstances, it would not be a stretch to
characterize Unionmatex’s experience with the Turkmen judicial
system as, for all practical purposes, depriving it of its day in court.
One would imagine that, under the Zapata standard, a U.S. court
would hold a forum selection clause invalid if it condemned a party
to adjudicate in a forum where it would have no translator, no
representation, and no practical right to appeal. However, arbitral
tribunals currently have no such standard. 155 All forum selection
clauses are treated as valid, no matter how egregious, and the court’s
analysis extends only to determining the exclusivity and scope of
the clause.
This seems especially concerning in cases involving disputes on
an international scale where the forums that may be selected are far
more diverse and may be more prone to corruption. The Zapata
standard was created by and is exclusively used by U.S. courts. 156
Id. at 6–7
Id. at 6.
154 Ballantyne, supra note 8.
155 Currently, the only standard resembling the Zapata standard in arbitral tribunals is
the futility doctrine, which may be applied to the requirement that certain remedies be
exhausted before a tribunal can grant jurisdiction to hear a case. According to principles
of international law, the requirement to exhaust other remedies before submitting to
arbitration can be waived if it can be shown that no remedy is available, or an attempt at
exhaustion would be futile. This is an insurmountably high standard as the tribunal in Kiliç
held that, despite rampant corruption and due process violations in Turkmen courts, the
claimant failed to show that such proceedings would be “futile.” Further, the futility
doctrine has been applied only in the case of exhaustion requirements, not to the
enforceability of forum selection clauses generally. See Kiliç, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1
at ¶¶ 3.4.1–3.4.36.
156 See generally Zapata, 407 U.S. 1.
152
153
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While it is one step in the right direction for U.S. courts to recognize
that forum selection clauses can be problematic for parties, the harm
and inconvenience that will come from one party litigating in one
U.S. forum as opposed to another U.S. forum is insignificant
compared to that which can arise from one party being forced to
litigate in a remote, developing nation. Under current arbitral rules
and precedent, an arbitral tribunal would conduct no analysis of the
enforceability of a forum selection clause for the courts of, say,
Somalia or North Korea, 157 but would instead only analyze the
exclusivity and scope of said clause.
VI. Conclusion
International institutions have developed a solution in response
to the increased globalization of commerce, business, and the
resulting litigation over the last half a century: international arbitral
institutions. 158 The arbitral process is tailor-made to suit the needs
of large-scale businesses and investors and to create a neutral forum
in which diverse parties can have their disputes resolved in a fair,
predictable, and efficient process. 159 The importance of these
tribunals is further solidified by their inclusion in the terms of the
thousands 160 of BITs which countries have signed. 161 However,
when forum selection clauses in private contracts prevent arbitral
institutions from hearing the claims they’re designed to resolve or
prevent BITs from protecting the interests of parties they’re
designed to protect, the result is inequity.
Unionmatex is still waiting for a determination of whether the
ICSID tribunal will grant jurisdiction to hear its case and which
claims the forum selection clause does or does not prevent the
tribunal from hearing. 162 If the tribunal, following the logic of the
157 Both of which are currently perceived to be two of the most corruption nations in
the world. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 [https://perma.cc/MPF8-5MR5] (last visited Nov.
24, 2019).
158 See Robin, supra note 36, at 136–38.
159 See id.
160 Yackee, supra note 18, at 401 (“Since 1959, states have signed over 2500 broadly
similar agreements[.]”).
161 See id. at 403 (“BITs [began] to routinely couple . . . substantive promises with an
important procedural guarantee: the right of the investor to initiate binding, enforceable
international arbitration against the host state for alleged treaty breaches.”).
162 Case Details, supra note 12.
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Vivendi line of decisions, finds that the forum selection clause bars
it from hearing any contract claims and that the alleged breaches of
the Turkmen government under the BIT are strictly contract claims
or too interwoven with the performance of the contract for the
tribunal to hear independently, Unionmatex will have no further
recourse. It will be bound to the judgment of the Turkmen courts,
which decided the outcome of Unionmatex’s future with no
translator, no legal representation, and no opportunity for appeal. 163
Lawyers who are asked to represent clients in this situation can
do some clever arguing to try to limit the scope or exclusivity of a
forum selection clause or try to avoid the clause altogether by
characterizing an investor’s loss as a breach of treaty, rather than a
breach of contract. However, arbitral institutions are in the best
situation to resolve this issue. When presented with a case involving
a contract containing a forum selection clause, the tribunal might
avoid injustice by asking one simple preliminary question: would
enforcement of this forum selection clause result in an inequitable
outcome? Further, while tribunals might like to characterize
protections of BITs as non-waivable, allowing parties to reserve part
or all of an ICSID case to be heard in domestic courts in practice
creates an effective waiver of supposedly non-waivable treaty
protections. Tribunals might avoid this loophole simply by
allowing no part of a claim arising under a BIT to be delegated away
to domestic courts by a contractual forum selection clause.

163

See Ballantyne, supra note 8.

